



Too much

Amend

# Commander's Assessment

• Council of Representatives Seating - 1130 - Pacheco REs 505T/506A/506B

• EOM - GOVT 30-COP; 15 PM NO SPEE DEPARTS

• Baghdad and Araba'een Security - MURKINS + MOVEMENTS premise defect present

## OPERATION SCALES OF JUSTICE

• OPERATION SWARMER

• Haditha Investigation

• Strategy Review Follow-Up - CW 1.4b BASE BUCKS

Amend

- FUNCTIONAL TRANSITION TIMING - Star Chart

- CITIES

INT CAPTION BLTN

**From:** [b 3, b(6)] MNFI STRATEGIC EFFECTS **On Behalf Of** CPIC Press Desk  
**Sent:** Friday, March 17, 2006 1:33 PM  
**To:** CPIC Press Desk  
**Subject:** [U] IRAQ: MNC-I directs Haditha investigation

## MNC-I directs Haditha investigation

*NOT  
CLASS*

**BAGHDAD, Iraq** -- Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli, Multi-National Corps - Iraq Commanding General, directed further investigation into events surrounding an insurgent attack in Haditha, Iraq, Nov. 19, 2005.

On that day, Marines assigned to the Marine Expeditionary Force responded to an IED and small-arms fire attack on their convoy.

"There are allegations of potential misconduct, and they will be investigated," said Lt. Gen. Chiarelli.

Lt. Gen. Chiarelli initiated a preliminary investigation Feb. 14 when allegations of possible violations of the rules of engagement were brought to the attention of coalition officers.

On March 9, Lt. Gen. Chiarelli was presented with the initial findings of that preliminary investigation. Based on the recommendation of the investigating officer, he directed further review of the incident.

-30-


*- NCIS ✓*  
*- REPORTING - HONOR*

FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING THIS RELEASE, CONTACT  
THE MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE AT

[b(6)]



OPERATION SWARMER: 161000 MAR Task Force 3/101ABN conducts Air Assault and clears Objective STAG NLT 17 MAR to disrupt AIF/AQIZ operations affecting Samarra, Ad Dawr, and Salah Din Province.



### Results (as of 1300 17 March)

31 AIF Detained  
6 Caches discovered  
0 Casualties

Cache contents include:  
• ~200 rounds artillery and mortar ammunition

- IED components
- Bulk explosives
- Medical supplies
- Iraqi Army uniforms
- RPGs
- Land mines
- Surface to Air missile components
- Rockets
- Small arms

Forces Involved  
Iraqi Security Forces  
3/101st  
Total


1023  
684  
1707

- Aircraft ~50
- Tactical Vehicles ~200



# Operation Scales of Justice


<b>"Scales" Patrols (+91)</b>	
• Coalition Only	25
• Combined	9
• Iraqi Army only	33
• National Police	24
<b>"Scales" Traffic Control Points (+111)</b>	
• Coalition	68
• Iraqi Army	43
<b>"Scales" Operations</b>	<b>202</b>
<b>"National Unity" Patrols and TCPs</b>	
	136
<b>Other Enduring Operations</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>TOTAL Operations</b>	<b>359</b>






MND-SUL  
BAGHDAD  
KAD  
THAWRA  
MANSOUR

3400 - (652) CT 1750 1SF



Additional units to MND-BAGHDAD					
UNIT/AOR	DEPARTURE TIME	PROJECTED ARRIVAL TIME	ACTUAL ARRIVAL TIME	PAX	REMARKS
RCT 5(1/MAR) MNF-W	13 2300C MAR06	14 0700C MAR 06	14 0500C MAR 06	600	
1-33 CAV MND-N	13 2000C MAR06	14 1200C MAR 06	14 0244C MAR 06	400	
3/1/5 IA MND-N	14 0700C MAR06	14 1200C MAR 06	14 1310C MAR 06	590	
TF  Call Forward Force)	130745C MAR06	150745 C MAR06	150215C MAR06	651	
2/2 SP CDO MOI / MNF-W	15 0200C MAR 06	15 1000C MAR 06	151000C MAR06	183	
1/2 POB MOI / MNF-W	21 0600C MAR06 (NLT)	21 MAR 06 (T)		318	Unit awaiting MOI movement order.
3/4 SP CDO MOI / MND-N	19 MAR 06 (AM)	19 MAR 06 (PM)		220	On Track for 19 March Movement
3/1/1 IA	n/a	n/a	n/a	725	On site. Already TACON to 4ID

 Coalition (1651)  
 Iraqi Army (1315)  
 Iraqi Police (441)

3400 additional forces – 1650 Coalition and 1750 ISF






SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFU//20160317



## MURDERS/EXECUTIONS 22 Feb – 16 Mar

Marked increase in murders since 22 Feb Golden Mosque attack

- Average number of murders per week pre 22 Feb; 77
- Average number of murders per week post 22 Feb; 231
- *Figures based on fusion of NJOC and SIGACTS reporting*
- Methods of disposal have become less cautious
  - fewer attempts to conceal bodies (ie down drains)
  - discoveries of large numbers increasing
- Militia cells – JAM and also Badr – involved in majority of killings
- Available intel indicates Sunnis are the primary victims; bodies located in Shi'a dominated neighborhoods




**Assessment: Badr and JAM responsible for majority of revenge killings after Mosque attack, recent VBIEDS in Sadr City. JAM likely used post-Mosque attack chaos to increase sectarian killings and expand influence. T&FF possibly involved, attempting to exploit sectarian tensions.**



SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ and MCF//20160317



# Weekly Murders and Executions in Iraq since September 2005






SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ and MCFH//20160317

## CURRENT SITUATION


- **Rise in Extra-Judicial Killings following 22 Feb Attack**
  - Since 22 Feb Mosque attack there has been a significant rise in numbers of bodies found and numbers of discoveries of large groups of bodies
    - Average number of murders per week pre 22 Feb; 87
    - Average number of murders per week post 22 Feb; 199
  - Groups conducting Extra-Judicial Killings (EJK) capitalizing on strong public sentiment following major attacks against sectarian icons
    - Local official stated JAM was increasingly targeting Sunnis following 22 Feb; specifically targeting Sunnis in Sadr City
      - Attacks believed to not be sanctioned or authorized by Sadr; believed to be conducted by independent, JAM-affiliated cells
  - Significant rise in number of high-profile discoveries of large groups of bodies
    - 14 March, 15 bodies found in truck in Mansour district; method of killing almost identical to 7 March incident when 18 bodies were found
    - Investigation of 7 March killings determined most victims were Sunni
      - Victims stopped at checkpoint during morning commute
  - *Rise in EJK's in Baghdad direct result of Golden Mosque attack. Independent JAM-affiliated cells conducting majority of attacks. High levels of EJK's reinvigorated by subsequent 12 March VBIED attacks in Sadr City.*







as of 17 MAR 06/0430



SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20160317

## Casualty data from SIGACTs



(b)(3), (b)(6)

**MNF-I CMD GRP XO**

**From:** [b 3, (b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Friday, March 17, 2006 3:22 AM  
**To:** [b 3 b 6]  
Timothy E Maj Gen MNFI COS; Austin, MG Lloyd J. (USA); Nichols, VADM David C. (USN);  
[b 6] MNF-I SCJS  
**Cc:** [b(3), (b)(6)]  
**Subject:** Haditha Press Release & Options (~~S//NF~~)  
**Importance:** High  
**Attachments:** Haditha information paper March\_16\_2006.rtf; Haditha Release (V5).doc

**Classification:** ~~SECRET NOFORN~~

Sir,  
Request you provide the attached documents to GEN Casey as soon as he is available. Use to brief & prepare GEN Casey for the SECDEF Phone Call on 171220zMAR06 (Friday).

Attached documents are:

- Information paper - Coordination of Investigations into Haditha Incident
- MNC-I Press Release

**Please Acknowledge**

V/R

[b(3), (b)(6)]

Executive Officer for  
Deputy CDR CENTCOM

[b(6)]

Haditha information paper Marc... Haditha Release (V5).doc (33 K...

DERIVED FROM: USCENTCOM Classification Guide 0501  
DECLASSIFY ON: 16 Mar 2016



Pages 12 through 13 redacted for the following reasons:

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DRAFT - Not Reviewed for Declassification

Approved for Release





UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

MULTI NATIONAL FORCE-WEST  
I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (FORWARD)  
UIC 42510  
FPO AP 96426-2540

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,  
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff  
Declassified on: 201505

IN REPLY TO  
5800  
SJA

From: Commanding General, Multi National Force-West,  
I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward)

To: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE REPORTING OF THE  
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING AN IED ATTACK AND ENSUING  
FIREFIGHT INVOLVING KILO CO, 3RD BATTALION, 1ST MARINES  
ON 19 NOVEMBER 2005

Ref: (a) JAG INSTRUCTION 5800.7D (JAGMAN)

1. This memorializes my verbal direction of 12 March 2006 appointing you, per chapter II of reference (a), to inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding the subject matter. You are directed to inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding the reporting of information concerning the events of 19 November 2005 involving the patrol of Kilo Co, 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, 1<sup>st</sup> Marines, that was subject to an IED explosion and an immediately ensuing firefight with insurgents amidst several houses that date. Your inquiry must include and consider all voice, spot, SIGACT, CCIR and other official reporting, including press releases.

2. Consider and evaluate all reporting at all levels from unit patrol through and including MNF-W for accuracy, consistency and compliance with applicable regulation and policy. Determine if any intentional or negligent miscommunication or misdirection resulted in incorrect reporting of events.

3. This patrol was engaged with hostile forces numerous times throughout 19 November; center your focus on the reporting of morning events beginning with the first IED explosion and ending immediately preceding the discovery of a second unexploded IED, unless reporting with regard to additional events is germane to your above inquiry and evaluation.

4. You are directed to proceed to any location necessary for this investigation. Investigate all facts and circumstances surrounding the incident. Report your findings of facts, opinions, and recommendations in letter form within 10 working days from the date of this letter. Any request for extension of time will be directed to me and must be in writing.

5. Your attention is directed to the Privacy Act and Article 31, UCMJ. Use the Suspect's Rights Acknowledgment Form,



Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE REPORTING OF THE  
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE IED ATTACK AND ENSUING  
FIREFIGHT INVOLVING KILO CO, 3RD BATTALION, 1ST MARINES  
ON 19 NOVEMBER 2005

Appendix A-1-m(1) of the reference, prior to taking a statement  
from anyone you suspect of having committed an offense under the  
UCMJ.

6. You are directed to coordinate with the I MEF (Fwd) DSJA,  
(b)(3), (b)(6) for guidance in completing this investigation.

R. C. ZILMER

Copy to:  
SJA, I MEF(FWD)  
File

Approved for Release



## Operational Summary

	Number detained	Foreign fighters	INTs		Number OPNs/OBJs
			Dev	Tri	
North	18	0	1 7	1 7	7/8
Central (incl Knight)	41	0	14 8	14 8	16/22
West	27	0	7 4	7 4	11/13
OTHER	0	0	0 0	0 0	0/0
Totals	86	0	0 0	0 0	34/43

## TSF/INTEL Highlights

Interrogations continue to provide insight into AQIZ leadership, operational, and logistic infrastructure

(b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
-PC: (b)(6)	-Provided TTPs on Foreign Fighter Facilitation	-Senior Religious personality for Karkh; responsible for mosques	-Kidnapping Cell Member
(b)(6)	-Identified key personnel in the FFF network	-Provided information on key religious personalities of AQIZ	-Provided info on his involvement in Italian kidnappings
(b)(6)	-Mid-level Military Commander for AQIZ	-Identified key AQIZ leadership for Al Anbar	-Provided info on 20 <sup>th</sup> Revolutionary Brigade and other insurgent personalities
(b)(6)	-Confirmed (b)(6) info on the FFF network to include TTPs and key POCs		

## Situation Update

AMZ: Four unconfirmed AMZ reports; none provided actionable intelligence.

- > Most promising leads center around senior AQIZ leadership in Baghdad
- > 'Atiyah' movement provides potential targeting opportunities due to internal and external movement of key AQ, AAS, and AQIZ personalities
- > Unclear if (b)(6) al Masri and Ali Wali movements are related to 'Atiyah' mission

(b)(6), 1.4b, 1.4d

WEST: Focused on Ramadi-Fallujah corridor in support of OPN Steelers while monitoring facilitation networks in Western Iraq

- > Detainee reporting providing insight into AQIZ senior personalities in Al Anbar to include (b)(6) he assessed AQIZ Emir of Zaydan and AMZ associate.

## Highlights

- 8 PC PID from 43 OBJs
- 19 SIGINT, 22 HUMINT, 2 FMV

- 10 Mar. OBJ ARNETT (b)(6) Operational Commander of AAS in Mosul, one of the last known senior extremist who operated under Abu Talha
- 10 Mar. OBJ LIGHTWATER VIII (b)(6) close associate of Jasim al-Hishmawi. Reportedly involved in the CPT and (b)(6) kidnappings. Also involved in the construction of VBIEDs.
- 12 Mar. OBJ CORDOVA III (b)(6) close associate of (b)(6) from the Bay'aa Car Market. Assertions he meets frequently w/ (b)(6) are significant & may indicate a more elevated stature than originally assessed.
- 13 Mar. OBJ CLOSSEN (b)(6) a senior AQIZ leader with ties to AQIZ' (b)(6) based network and may facilitate movement of HV's into Iraq.
- 15 Mar. OBJ LIMEHOUSE II (b)(6) a Kuwaiti-born AQI cell leader based in the Balad area. Has operational insight into extremist cells in various locations. His cell involved in ops. against CF and IZ civilians.
- 15 Mar. OBJ ROSWELL III (b)(6) and is involved in Jaish al-Mujahideen VBIED/IED cells and facilitates foreign fighters.

UK FORCE

→ HAMZA - not cell leader. Took fire from him

1 male 2 FID (FNL)

4 - Wammash



# TF AO Steelers Disposition





Legend

Iraqi

Foreign jihadist (non-Iraqi)

Iran

Kirkuk

Baghdad-based Senior Leadership

RELIGION MEDIA SECURITY MILITARY ADMIN

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

E. Al-Anbar

Foreign Fighter Facilitation Network

(b)(6)

Abu Usama

- Baghdad leadership extends beyond Baghdad; remains vital to operational success
- Several distinct, yet interconnected networks
- Foreign fighter facilitators in al-Anbar remain prominent; likely have limited operational control of some AQIZ cells

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Foreign Fighter Facilitation Network

(b)(6)

**E. Al-Anbar**

Baghdad-based Senior Leadership  
RELIGION MEDIA SECURITY MILITARY

(b)(6)

## Legacy leadership

(b)(6)

Iran

### Legend



Iraqi

Foreign jihadist (non-Iraqi)



## OUTLOOK: Ethno-Sectarian Conflict

- Weekly reported incidents increased to 89
  - 15 targeted Shi'a, 11 Sunni, 1 Kurd and 62 suspected
- Total casualties: 178 KIA, 186 WIA
- Triple digit attack numbers for second consecutive month
- Incidents directed at Shia:
  - Four VBIEDs detonate in Sadr City; 52 KIA, 96 WIA
  - Shi'a religious student murdered, Baghdad; 1 KIA
  - Two SAF attacks on Shi'a mosques, Baghdad; 1 KIA, 2 WIA
  - SAF attack near Sunni mosque, victims' vehicle contained Mahdi Militia badges, Baghdad; 1 KIA, 2 WIA
  - Deputy MoT (and OMS member) murdered, Baghdad; 1 KIA
  - IED defused at Shi'a mosque, Kirkuk
  - Report of checkpoints detaining and murdering Shi'a, Abu Ghraib; no reported casualties
  - Shi'a family members murdered, Kirkuk; 3 KIA
- Incidents directed at Sunni:
  - Report of 22 Sunni kidnapped from a mosque, Baghdad
  - Leaflets tell girls school IVO Sunni mosque to evacuate, principal receives threat mosque to be mortared, Baghdad
  - IED detonated at Sunni tomb, Tikrit; no casualties
  - Former IA Colonel murdered, Baghdad; 1 KIA
  - SAF attack on Sunni funeral, Baghdad; 2 KIA, 2 WIA
  - Sunni imam murdered, Baghdad; 1 KIA
  - SAF attack on Sunni mosque, Baghdad; 1 KIA
  - Sunni shaykh kidnapped, Baghdad
  - VBIED targets IP, kills Sunni imam, Samarra; 1 KIA, 11 WIA
- Other:
  - Five VBIEDs target civilians, Baghdad, Baqubah, Al Hillah; 7 KIA, 34 WIA
- 44 incidents of human remains found murdered execution style in Baghdad; 80 KIA
- Umar Brigade claims 11 Badr members killed



**Assessment:** Incidents remain high, with an increase in casualties. Majority killed are result of VBIEDs and executions. Likely T&FF targeting Shi'a with VBIEDs; Shi'a militia retaliation with executions and murders of suspected T&FF and Sunni. Expect civilian targeting to increase this week in anticipation of Arba'een, with considerable Shi'a militia reprisal in response to T&FF attacks on participants.





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
## CURRENT SITUATION – Murder Spike in Baghdad

Marked increase in murders since 22 Feb Golden Mosque attack

- 156 bodies discovered in last 48 hours; 79 murders, and 77 executions
- Since 22 Feb Golden Mosque attack, 696 bodies discovered, average of 33 per day; significantly above pre 22 Feb norm of 11 per day
- Methods of disposal have become less cautious
  - Fewer attempts to conceal bodies
  - Finding increasing number of sites with multiple bodies

Murders and Executions:

9 - 14 March 06



**Assessment:** Militias responsible for majority of killings, in revenge for Mosque attack and recent VBIEDS in Sadr City. T&FF possibly responsible for selected incidents to provoke sectarian violence. More blatant disposals intended to convey strong deterrent message.






MNF-I DCSINT



## Locations of Bodies Discovered since 22 Feb 06





PT-187  
ABN OP.

- Paid built armed info

from IQIS - ARIZ

- 1/4 / 750 helos  
Daylight 1000 50/50

- Cordan 10K X 20K

Joint  
- Bliz w/ 1A in LD

- BASHIEL - CDO BIE SMTA

→ Working thru areas

→ Desert area - water barrier

→ 3-4 Cucke (A) Rocket r  
w/ 100s

DET 540/17

1 ED making

TAKEN STUFF

S, THAM TOMORROW

Approved for Release



FOCUS  
16 Mar 06

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

### Current Top 10 Key Tasks

- Secure HVC-1 (43<sup>rd</sup> Bde)
- Reinforce due process (SJA)
- Develop formal resourcing requirement for FY07 and revised timeline (Transition, J3)
- Complete first 3 expansion compounds (En)
- Execute detainee strategy:
  - Internal counter insurgency program (J2, 43<sup>rd</sup>)
  - Reintegration program (DCdr, IO)
  - Release Strategy – Link to Reintegration program and support Abu closure (J3, SJA)
- Move out of Abu Ghraib (Transition, J3)
- Institutionalize the inspection of Iraqi facilities (J3)
- Institutionalize oversight of SOF facilities ( Master Chief)
- Review/document unwritten policies in addendum to MNF-I 11-1 (includes restraint, ROE, Discpl matrix, return to unit, ...) (J3, SJA)
- Execute a major positive communications event Jun 06 (PAO)
- Correct and Institutionalize all databases (J6, J3, SJA)

### First 120-Day Post-Election Goals

- Reinforce CCCI as an enduring institution
- Educate key Govt officials, religious & civic leaders on Security Detention/CCCI process and release program
- Establish a high-level Govt mechanism/committee to review facility inspection results and propose legislation
- Establish key contacts in detention and rule of law functional areas
- Convince PMOI/MeK to realistically define their end state

249  
CPRB - not w/in 6 MO of capture  
- done by EOM  
- new group - 1 APR - 990 days  
- reviewed every 120 days  
- 2300 TOA kept - 2:6 to detain

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~



(b)(3), (b)(6)

**NF-I CG Aide-de-Camp**

**From:** Casey George GEN MNF-I CG  
**Sent:** Friday, March 17, 2006 8:35 AM  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: [U] 15-6 Investigation -- Haditha (U)  
**Categories:** ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY, UNCLASSIFIED, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~  
**Classification Caveat:** ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~  
**Classification Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED

**Classification:** ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

print

**Classification:** ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

**From:** Abizaid, John P. GEN (USA) [mailto:(b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 11, 2006 5:58 PM  
**To:** Nichols, VADM David C. (USN)  
**Cc:** Casey George GEN MNF-I CG  
**Subject:** RE: [C] 15-6 Investigation -- Haditha (U)

Thanks Dave, does Chairman know about this? JRA

**From:** Nichols, VADM David C. (USN)  
**Sent:** Friday, March 10, 2006 3:18 PM  
**To:** Abizaid, John P. GEN (USA)  
**Cc:** Sattler, John F. LtGen, CG IMEF/MARCENT  
**Subject:** FW: [C] 15-6 Investigation -- Haditha (U)

**Classification:** ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Boss, FYI... Dave

THURS  
→

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, March 10, 2006 2:06 PM  
**To:** Nichols, VADM David C. (USN); Austin, MG Lloyd J. (USA)  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: [C] 15-6 Investigation -- Haditha

Sirs:

See summary immediately below from Gen Casey's SJA. Alleged LOAC violation involving Marines killing 15 civilians in response to an IED attack on 19 Nov 2005. The first attachment detailing the meeting with the TIME reporter is also worth reading. I will keep you posted as this develops.

v/r

3/17/2006



(b)(3), (b)(6)

---

**From:** [b(3), b(6)] MNF-I SJA STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE  
**[mailto:** [b(3), (b)(6)]  
**Sent:** Friday, March 10, 2006 12:13 PM  
**To:** [b(3), (b)(6)]  
**Subject:** FW: [C] 15-6 Investigation -- Haditha

**Classification:** ~~CONFIDENTIAL//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

[b(3), (b)(6)]

Heads up.

TIME magazine recently brought to our attention allegations of Marines shooting non-combatants in Haditha on 19 Nov and asked us to confirm the story. MNC-I conducted a AR 15-6 investigation into the events of that day and have determined that additional criminal investigation by NCIS is necessary. Facts as we know them is that following an IED explosion in which one Marine was killed and two injured, a four vehicle convoy from K Co, 3 Bn, 1 MAR received small arms fire from multiple directions. In responding to the attacks and clearing homes that appeared to be the source of the SAF, 15 civilians and 9 suspected AIF were killed. Of the 15 civilians, nine were women and children (oldest 76 and youngest 3 yrs old). The 2MARDIV press release of the events is attached above. An investigation was not conducted after the event. Notes of the meeting with TIME are also attached above. When MNC-I received the information, they sent a senior IN colonel and a FG legal advisor to Haditha to conduct an AR 15-6 investigation. Their thorough investigation raises the strong possibility that the Marines did not attempt to positively identify hostile actors before engaging them, a possible violation of the law of armed conflict. In fact I read the statement of the Sergeant in charge of the team and he candidly and openly admitted that his orders to his four man team was to "shoot first and ask questions later." Accordingly, additional investigation is warranted.

We will keep you posted and I advised [b(6)] to send up a LOAC Report.  
r/

[b(3), (b)(6)]

Staff Judge Advocate, MNF-I  
DSN [b(6)]

**Classification:** ~~CONFIDENTIAL//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

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**From:** [b(3), (b)(6)] MNFI STRATEFF COMMS DIV  
**Sent:** Saturday, February 11, 2006 21:23

3/17/2006



To: Wright Rudy BG MNFI STRATEFF

Cc: [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** TIME Allegations on Haditha Attack, 19 NOV 05

Sir;

Attached is the Memorandum For Record on my review of material provided by TIME Magazine's Tim McGirk regarding **allegations against unidentified Marines accused of killing 15 civilians** after an IED killed one Marine in Haditha on 19 NOV 05.

These **allegations are substantial**. [redacted] b 6 appears sincere in wanting to ensure the information is fully investigated before they report anything. However, we should assume other media are being provided the same info and are likely to push it out regardless of what TIME does.

**Recommend this information be provided to criminal investigators** for evaluation.

I have possession of the video, which must be reformatted before I can send it as a file.

Yr,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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DECLASSIFY ON: 10 Mar 2016

Approved for Release



Pages 27 through 28 redacted for the following reasons:

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